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What Testimony Does to Literature 
 
 





This article sheds light on a literary practice that critics began to reflect upon in 
the twentieth century: witnessing. This genre, by adopting a narrative model 
based on statements of evidence presented in the courtroom, distinguishes 
itself from other forms of expression practiced by witnesses. Survivors of 
political violence take up their pens and describe the situation they have been 
subjected to, so as to attest to historical facts and prevent erasure of the event 
through forgetting, denial or negation. This enterprise, which seeks to 
document lived experience and thereby pay homage to victims who did not 
survive, constitutes both a source of evidence for legal procedure and a 
contribution to the writing of history. Witnessing, however literary it may be, is 
founded on a pact of veracity, in which witnesses are bound to relate no more 
than their own experience and to do so with precision. Finally, witness accounts 
are addressed to society at large or even to humanity as a whole, in the hope of 
emancipating it from such violence by raising awareness of its intolerable 
nature. Though witnessing still lacks legitimacy within the literary field, the link 
it establishes between ethical, aesthetic and political positions makes this genre 




For a long time, one did not ‘testify’ in literature.1 It is a relatively recent 
literary practice for survivors of political violence to write and publish detailed 
accounts of the events they have witnessed, to bring them to widespread 
attention. For acts of testifying to become a distinctive social phenomenon 
required the development of a democratic culture, from the nineteenth 
century onwards in the West. But the real expansion of such practices came in 
the following century, when the world wars and the numerous crimes against 
humanity and genocides forced so many to face what Miguel Abensour called 
the “modern terror” (231).2  As Jean Norton Cru observed in 1929 in his 
analysis of the writings of First World War combatants, the practices of 
witnesses are diverse: diaries, reminiscences, reflections, letters and novels 
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(War Books 45); and other forms should also be included, such as poetry or 
theatre. Yet among these testimonial practices, the one which particularly 
interests us here emerged as a new literary genre in the mid-twentieth century, 
at the same time as a new international law of human rights was being 
established: testimony which, in diary form (in medias res) or in the form of 
memoirs (after the fact), is written “as a judicial act” 3  and whose 
distinguishing feature is the use of a narrative model inherited from the legal 
deposition. 
 
Testifying through literature: a judicial act 
 
World War I marked an important step towards the establishment of 
testimony as a genre. Several factors combined to produce an unprecedented 
growth in testimonial practices at this time. The devastating effects of 
increased firepower, which led to new ways of “waging war” and dying from 
it, are not the only explanation. Also significant was that the shock of war 
affected massive numbers of civilians at a time when the average level of 
education was higher than in previous centuries. As such, the soldiers’ 
ignorance of the realities of battle appeared all the more “inconceivable” (Cru, 
Témoins 411) to them at their first taste of action. The “need for truth” that 
compelled many of them to write their testimonies originated in their 
stupefaction at such unprecedented political violence,4 which it was important 
to make known to as many people as possible. The same can be said, mutatis 
mutandis, of the crime perpetrated at the same time in the Ottoman Empire, 
which targeted the entire Armenian people and which was difficult to name. 
Both cases involved the social construction of an intolerable,5 which in the 
1940s led to the creation of the legal concepts of ‘war crime,’ ‘crime against 
humanity’ and ‘crime of genocide.’ 
This was an historic recognition, and depended on three phenomena 
that emerged in the nineteenth century, besides the rise in literacy: the ‘age of 
rights’ ushered in by the American and French revolutions, which enshrined 
the universal idea of human rights; the gradual formation of the social 
sciences, at first in close association with literature, which led in particular to 
a renewal of the discipline of literary history; and, finally, the unprecedented 
development of printing techniques, which encouraged the publication of all 
types of written material. The role played by the press should be stressed, first 
because newspapers published or supported the publication of survivor 
testimonies very early on,6 and second because the rising figure of the reporter 
in the second half of the nineteenth century accustomed readers to a 
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documentary standard based on witness accounts. WWI combatants and 
Armenian survivors had a cruel knowledge of the war or genocidal event that 
decimated them and recognised its significance for humanity; consequently, 
for the press to be drafted into the service of state propaganda and for the 
event, whether silenced or falsified, to escape the awareness of their 
contemporaries was quite simply intolerable. 
This point is decisive. Never before the early twentieth century had the 
fear been so literally expressed that the reality of such historic violence might 
be obscured by a project of denial. This is as true for the Great War as it is for 
the genocide of the Armenians, which produced the same thirst to tell the story, 
the same necessity for the survivors to testify to the facts they had witnessed. 
In the case of the genocide, the act of bearing witness was encouraged by an 
appeal launched at the initiative of the Committee for Assistance to Deportees 
on 22 November 1918, in an Armenian newspaper in Constantinople. Entitled 
“Armenian Martyrdom Must be Proven,” this appeal no doubt contributed to 
the “sudden and widespread emergence of deportation writing” in 1919.7 As 
survivors of mass crimes had often been urged to remain silent and forget, this 
exhortation to testify was particularly important. Faced with the world’s 
deafness and strategies of denial,8 some despaired at times of ever finding a 
sympathetic ear to listen and give credence to the narrative of their experience. 
Yet if “all Armenians who knew how to spell and who returned from 
deportation considered it their duty to describe what they saw” (Beledian “Le 
retour de la Catastrophe” 309), 9  it was because for the survivors of this 
genocide and, later, for the survivors of Auschwitz, “the need to tell our story 
to ‘others,’ to make ‘others’ share it, took on for us […] the character of an 
immediate and violent impulse, to the point of competing with other 
elementary needs” (Levi, Preface n.p.). In this respect, the efforts that victims 
made to bear witness even before they were out of danger are particularly 
moving. Armenian journalist Chavarche Missakian, while fortunate enough to 
escape deportation, clearly felt this need. He risked his life by remaining as a 
clandestine in Constantinople in 1915 because he considered that there was 
nothing more vital at that time than to thwart, through his testimony, the law 
of silence imposed by the perpetrators of the genocide (see Missakian 47–59). 
In a different context—Japan after the bombing of Hiroshima—Ota Yôko was 
driven by a similar impulse to brave American censorship and write City of 
Corpses; as her French translator Maya Morioka Todeschini points out, “Ota 
feverishly recorded the events, writing on shreds of paper torn from the sliding 
doors typical of Japanese interiors or on toilet paper,” while “terrified of dying 
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from radiation before she could complete her story” (136). Remarkably 
similarly, though the stakes were different, WWI combatants had already felt 
the vital need to pass on their experience of war, “not to counter its being 
passively forgotten, but to counter its deliberate cover-up.” 10  “When the 
humbug impresses us as too much, and is run off at the rate of millions of 
copies, a feeling of anger comes to us very quickly,” observed Raymond Jubert 
in his memoirs (qtd. in Cru, War Books 43) regarding the false praise received 
in the press; and indeed many, like Maurice Genevoix, were angry at “the 
windjammers who manufacture their heroism, and the collectors of 
extraordinary deeds of prowess, and the concocters of exploits especially for 
the rear” (qtd. in Cru, War Books 97) and what Jean Drève called “the 
blatantly deceitful splendour in which the slaughter is disguised” (qtd. in Cru, 
Témoins 295). As the war gave them “a horror of falsehood,” many soldiers 
took up the pen, driven, as Jules-Émile Henches was, by “the more ardent 
desire for truth” (qtd in Cru, War Books 2). 
It is on the basis of this critical consciousness that testimony became 
established in literature as a “judicial act.” While published testimony has 
sometimes led to the opening of a judicial enquiry or even been included in 
the prosecution’s case in a trial, literary testimony is more commonly intended 
to prepare the ground for the court of history to judge the events it documents. 
After the Nazi occupation of Europe, Jewish survivors who had managed to 
produce and preserve testimonial writings entrusted them, with this aim in 
view, to the Jewish Historical Commissions that were formed at the time. Leon 
Weliczker’s genocide diary, part of which was published in 1946 under the 
Polish title of Brygada śmierci [The Death Brigade] by the Central Jewish 
Historical Commission at Łódź, was used as evidence at the Eichmann trial in 
Jerusalem, in addition to Weliczker’s testimony which it had made possible; 
but this use of his testimony illustrates precisely what helped make the 
Eichmann trial a trial for history. In 1929, Jean Norton Cru had endeavoured 
to advocate such use of testimonies in Témoins. This “Analytical and critical 
essay on soldiers’ memoirs published in French from 1915 to 1928,” which was 
the first corpus study based on the authors’ status as witnesses, aimed to bring 
to light the truth content of the accounts and was intended “particularly” for 
historians (26). This was no mean challenge given that, as Cru pointed out, 
military historians had until then deemed the materials produced by troops 
unworthy of submitting to criticism and had dismissed them as potential 
sources. What Cru’s work shows is that literary testimony as a “judicial act” 
entails not only telling the truth but also proving that it is true. Soldiers took 
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so keenly into account the risk of being neither heard nor believed that their 
attitude as authors was often modelled on the oath of a witness testifying in 
court—who swears to tell ‘the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.’ 
Cru hailed “this concern for scientific accuracy which is the honour of our 
century” (Témoins 412) and which, in his view, allowed those who fought in 
the Great War to “surpass by far any attempts of past generations to give those 
who did not fight an image of war” (Témoins 226). Indeed, one perceives in 
the corpus that Cru studied, and especially in the prefaces he signed himself, 
an approach that already outlined the contours of the testimonial contract—a 
contract that exemplifies, in many respects, what testimony does to literature. 
 
‘The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth’ 
 
The attestatory function of testimony determines the terms of the testimonial 
contract, which is fundamentally a pact of truthfulness. Its first requirement 
is an attestation of the witness’s presence— “I was there,” “I saw,” “I lived it”—
which not only lends factual weight to the author’s words, but can at times be 
contentious. According to Cru, when Jean Bernier wrote that “The man who 
has not understood with his flesh cannot talk to you about it,” he expressed 
“the alpha and omega of all war literature by witnesses” (Témoins 575).11 For 
Cru, it was a question of contrasting the knowledge of the troops who “had 
[their] shoulder to the wheel” (War Books 16) and who, “from private to 
captain,” were exposed to danger, with the ignorance of the high command 
who “could not know for only their intelligence was in contact with the war” 
(War Books 14).12 Bearing witness to what one “understood with one’s flesh” 
under bombardment thus amounted to testifying against the staff officers who 
were supposed to know but who, through blindness and/or ignorance 
(disinformation is denounced in many testimonies), were responsible for 
countless deaths. It is not immaterial that the testimonial genre originated as 
a protest from individuals who had no say in the war that was destroying them, 
directed against those most authorised to speak about it. The witnesses 
emphatically claimed the authority of experience while at the same time 
warning against all forms of deceit, especially those clothed in political, media 
or literary legitimacy. 
The attestation of presence, which is the cornerstone of the witnesses’ 
testimony and concern for accuracy, is therefore crucial. By stressing this 
aspect, Cru initiated, in the name of the WWI combatants, a materialist-
inspired critique of culture: “What we see, what we live, ‘is’; what contradicts 
our experience, ‘is not’, whether it comes from the general-in-chief, from the 
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Memoirs of Napoleon, from the theories of the War College, or from the 
unanimous judgment of all the historians of war” (War Books 14). Testimonial 
writing relies on the empirical reality of events to assert what is, counter to 
both the most militant ideological discourses and the most insidious 
preconceptions. As Eric Hobsbawm explained, “unlike earlier wars, which 
were typically waged for limited and specifiable objects,” the First World War 
“was waged for unlimited ends”; “the only war aim that counted was total 
victory: what in the Second World War came to be called ‘unconditional 
surrender’” (30). What the testimonies attest to is that such a programme of 
destruction could only have been consistently based on a false representation 
of war, inherited in large part from the nineteenth century and the heroic 
representation of Napoleon’s campaigns. Therefore, to describe war as it is, 
i.e., as a material, historical and political event, is at the same time to 
demystify all that Cru condenses into the word “legend” (War Books 14) and 
which tends to make a phantasmagoria of war. 
Hence the requirement for testimonial concreteness and accuracy, 
which guarantees the text’s truth value and serves to preclude abstraction. It 
is a matter of breaking with the tradition of idealism, from which stems an 
ideological blindness to the very principle of mass crime. Indeed, their terrible 
experience of the shock of war led many witnesses to a “resolute refusal of the 
concept of ‘timeless truth’” (Benjamin 463) and to reduce the very idea of 
“truth” to more reasonable proportions. The truth the testimonies aim for, as 
Cru observes in Témoins, is not “dogmatic, absolute or transcendental truth, 
but an all-human truth, the truth of the sincere witness who says what he has 
done, seen and felt, a truth accessible to any intelligent man who knows how 
to see, reflect and feel” (661). Yet this materialist standpoint is not self-evident 
in literature; moreover, with few exceptions, witnesses who were already 
writers before going to the front and who wanted to get across the “truth of 
the war” preferred the historical fiction of the novel to the veracious narrative 
of the diary or memoir, convinced that they were reaching a higher truth. The 
rise of testimony brought with it a real literary schism. 
More precisely, the materialist position which is at the heart of the 
testimonial genre and its value as a historical document, and which prompts 
the authors of testimonies to prove their presence, sincerity and good faith, 
leads them to make what we call, following Miguel Abensour, the “choice of 
the small.”13 The expression rightly emphasises the modesty of the testimonial 
undertaking as expressed in the oath to tell ‘nothing but the truth.’ This focus 
on experience, this choice to stick to what one has experienced—seen, heard, 
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felt and thought—is a prerequisite for not speaking abstractly about war. Yet 
to most professional writer veterans who wrote a novel about the Great War, 
such a restriction seemed incompatible with their idea of literature, which 
entailed offering a panorama of the war that went beyond the limited 
perception of the witness. In Témoins, Norton Cru shows that these novelists 
sought to have it both ways: even though they “pride themselves on speaking 
as witnesses serving the cause of truth, revealing the war to the public as it 
really was” (War Books 51), they rejected the constraints of truthfulness that 
witnesses imposed on themselves—which did not stop them from being read 
and taken at their word. 
These novelists doubtless still owed much to the naturalists’ approach. 
While attached to the “documentary content” of their works, they nonetheless 
intended the “objectified facts,” by the grace of the novelistic plot, to be 
“transfigured … into a ‘vision,’ which orders and organizes the present by 
plunging it back into the pathos of epic and theological, evolutionist and 
historicist rhetoric” (Chevrier and Roussin 5). This is clearly how the witness-
novelists of the Great War continued to think of their art at the beginning of 
the 1930s when they claimed both the authority conferred by experience and 
the absolute freedom of the artist, and considered the experience of the 
witness as simply ‘raw material’ to be transcended. Heirs to the romantic 
theory of literature, these novelist witnesses were convinced that the liberty of 
artistic invention must surpass the constraint of experience, and that it is in 
this movement that the transubstantiation of the real into art takes place. 
“Why copy when you can create?” asked Roland Dorgelès (34), recalling 
Balzac’s words on “truly philosophical writers” who “invent the true” (Balzac 
52). The power to invent the true knowing no limits, Dorgelès could thus 
profess a “higher” goal: “not to recount my war, but the war,” (33) and aim to 
produce a synthesis of the war that gives access to a higher truth. This 
tradition has not disappeared. It is among these ‘inventors of the true’ that 
Jorge Semprún should be counted, according to François Rastier; in 
Literature or Life, Semprún claims “a narrative ‘I’ that draws on [his] 
experience but goes beyond it, capable of opening the narrative up to fiction, 
to imagination” (Rastier 118). 
By aiming for quite the opposite, the testimonial ‘choice of the small’ 
critiques the main pillar of literature as defined by the romantics, namely the 
dogma of the independence of art. Cru helped clarify this criticism by 
highlighting the collusion between the dogma of aesthetic independence and 
the ideological blindness of which witnesses were victims and which they 
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denounced in their writings. In particular, he demonstrated that despite their 
‘second sight’ supposedly able to compete with the historian’s gaze, the 
synthetic truth that novelists in fact produced was nothing but a fictitious web 
of errors of detail and fable—thereby doing a proud service to those who deny 
reality. What the ‘choice of the small’ brings to light, in contrast, is that the 
greatest challenge in art lies both in a living act of creation and a content of 
experience. It is the art of truth –in which, like Genevoix, one “refrains from 
any fabricated arrangement, any imaginative licence after the fact” (9)—that 
is most difficult. 
In one sense, it is true, witnesses’ knowledge is limited and their 
accounts are partial; but they at least know what they are doing: 
 
The fighter has short views. […] 
But because his views are narrow, they are sharp; because they are 
restricted, they are clear. He doesn’t see a lot, but what he does see he sees 
plainly. Because his own eyes and not those of others inform him, he sees 
what ‘is.’ (Georges Kimpflin qtd. in Cru, War Books 16) 
 
Nevertheless, to share this knowledge, witnesses must work on writing 
without sacrificing anything in artistic quality for the sake of factual precision. 
The very transmission of the testimonial voice is at stake here, as the 
documentary value of testimonies depends on their literary value. The 
difficulty lies in how to balance the ‘whole truth’ of the testimonial oath with 
the ‘nothing but the truth.’ Far from getting around the difficulty by confusing, 
as some novelists do, ‘the whole truth’ with the absolute truth, the witness who 
makes the ‘choice of the small’ aspires to nothing more than to tell “the truth 
about his war” (Cru, Témoins 36). Thus, the ethical duty to “work well” (Broch 
63) takes precedence above all else. 
 
Ethics, aesthetics and politics of testimony  
 
Telling ‘the whole truth’ does not mean telling the whole of one’s experience; 
it means telling what, in that experience, is most representative of what others 
subjected to the same treatment have also undergone. To avoid distorting the 
perspective, and so as not to fuel the imagination of readers eager for 
sensationalism, singular extremes are excluded. But some of the 
abominations recounted in testimonies nonetheless appear implausible. The 
art of testimonial truth therefore contrasts squarely with the art of novelistic 
verisimilitude as theorised by Maupassant.14 The attestation of presence and 
recurrent references to places and dates (in memoirs as well as in diaries) are 
also there to counter the reader’s disbelief—so bitterly feared by the witnesses. 
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As the dates act as “a reminder to honesty” for the authors themselves (Cru, 
War Books 45), these precise and precious references often guarantee the 
reliability of their testimonies. The space-time framework is especially 
important because it helps to make reality felt in its materiality and to convey, 
as André Pézard does in Nous autres à Vauquois, “the facts –not bare, but 
with their atmosphere” (Cru Témoins 226). 
Testimony, which is a personal document, should therefore not be 
confused with that other documentary practice: the report.15 It was by setting 
out to express “the war in its most intimate, concrete, human and essentially 
observable aspects” that the best witnesses of the Great War succeeded, 
according to Cru, in capturing the “atmosphere of the front which gave things 
all their value, strength, charm and horror” (Témoins VIII and 226), and 
thereby conveying a “psychological” truth that had never before got through. 
This is essential for “turning what had affected [the witness] into something 
that could affect [readers]” because, as Georges Perec wrote in an article on 
testimony, “facts do not speak for themselves. It is a mistake to think they do” 
(142). In Là-bas,16 First World War veteran Guy Hallé gives a palpable sense 
of the terrible anguish he experienced before the attack on Douaumont on 22 
May 1916, and enables us to better understand that “the hell of the soldiers 
[was] above all a hell of ideas” (Témoins 161). 
More precisely, testimonial writing is dialectical; it differs both from the 
report, based on a positivist conception of the facts, and from novelistic 
technique which aims to immerse the reader. Testimonial narrative rejects the 
pathos of action that gives readers the illusion of participating and lets them 
take refuge in easy emotion. On the contrary, the psychological truth of 
testimony is developed through distance, which reflects the distance between 
the witness who saw and experienced the events and the survivor who 
produces the retrospective account of them. Even if he or she relives the events 
while narrating them (sometimes very shortly afterwards), the witness 
“interposes [between his experience and us] the entire grid of a discovery and 
a memory and a consciousness which carry things through to the end” (Perec 
143), following a writing process which, Perec asserted, led Robert Antelme to 
provide, with The Human Race, “the finest example [...] of what literature can 
be” (150). 
If the intention to attest to the facts one has witnessed so as to give 
readers the means to rightly understand the event is not incompatible –far 
from it– with literary craft, if –indeed– “the testimony of survivors remains 
the honour of literature” (Rastier, “Témoignages inadmissibles” 127), it is 








Synthesis 13 (2020) 31 
based on a sparse eloquence. Stylistically speaking, the ‘choice of the small’ 
results in a form of sobriety. Those who drafted the appeal of 22 November 
1918 urging all survivors to bear witness and “prove the Armenian 
martyrdom” understood this perfectly, as they instructed authors to write 
“incisively (gdroug) and without embellishments (ansetheveth)” (qtd. in 
Beledian, “Traduire un témoignage” 111). 17  Against exaggeration in all its 
forms (stylistic ornaments, retrospective embellishments, sensationalism), 
witnesses professed a “rejection of the gigantic and the apocalyptic” (Perec 
142) that opened up new perspectives for literature. Whereas through 
spectacular fictions, as Jacques Rivette has observed, “everyone 
surreptitiously grows used to the horror” (54), restraint is exercised in 
testimony so that the reader does not become used to what witnesses have to 
say. 
Commenting in 1976 on his writing of If This Is a Man, Levi states: 
 
[…] I deliberately assumed the calm and sober language of the witness, not the 
lament of the victim nor the outrage of the avenger: I thought that my words 
would be most credible and useful the more they appeared objective and the 
less they sounded fervent. Only in this way does a witness fulfil his function, 
which is to prepare the ground for the judges. The judges are all of you. 
(“Appendice” 187) 
 
This choice of sobriety can be found in an author such as Marcel Cohen, who 
clearly expressed “the feeling [that writers of his generation have] of having 
been altogether swindled by a great deal of the literature of their century: too 
much ‘fine work’, charm, ego, stylistic effects, ‘little airs’ and great organ” 
(220). They are even less inclined to the literature of effects because they see 
it as a sinister sign of complicity. The work of the collaborationist writer Louis-
Ferdinand Céline represents an exemplary deterrent since, in his post-1945 
novel trilogy, the author used his “little airs” to deny the testimonies of 
deportation to the Nazi camps.18 
More generally, testimonial sobriety determines the “mental attitude” 
that Rithy Panh believes is part of the legacy of the finest witnesses of the 
twentieth century ,19 and which is not unrelated to what Levi says about the 
“theme of indignation” (La Zone grise 63). This “mental attitude,” which 
stems from a search for accuracy as a corollary of the desire for justice, 
harmonises with the three main functions of the genre –to attest, to pay 
homage and to educate – which are inseparable. Testimonies are more often 
written using “we” than “I,” not least because, as Panh does in his 
L’Élimination, witnesses dedicate their works to their missing ‘peers’ in an 
effort to pay off the debt they have incurred towards them. The homage 








Synthesis 13 (2020) 32 
function of testimonies, which gives them a quality akin to a tomb, should not 
be confused with the all-too-familiar ‘duty of remembrance.’ This point must 
be stressed, as it concerns the politics of testimony and therefore, also, its 
legacy. If witnesses find it important to relate the real agony experienced by 
their dead friends or relatives, it is because sounding out the depths of this 
suffering might allow for the motives and nature of the crime to be rigorously 
determined. This means that the fight against denial involves not only 
attestation (against the criminals) and paying homage (to the other victims) 
but also education (for future generations). In this regard, witnesses are 
‘messengers,’ to borrow the title of Laëtitia Tura’s and Hélène Crouzillat’s 
documentary film on the violence of contemporary migration policies 
(Crouzillat and Tura). Witnesses seek knowledge of the past in the hope of 
averting the perpetuation or repetition of the crime they suffered, and thus 
argue in favour of a form of literature viewed as a warning device. In doing so, 
witnesses initiated an art of writing that encourages us to rethink the 
relationship between artistic freedom and the ethics of responsibility, renews 
the notions of both author and creation, and redefines the forms of 
‘engagement’ in literature. 
The history of the reception—both public and critical—of the genre 
reveals that the literary schism brought about by testimony resulted in its long 
being poorly received. It still often remains “on the edge of literature,” as 
sociological research on literary fields in particular has shown.20 It is our hope, 
however, that the work we and others are doing will help, apart from its 
establishment as a genre, to substantiate it as literature—not only in law but 
in fact. 
 





1 This article is a revised version of an earlier publication in French, the introduction 
to a special issue of the journal Europe: see Detue and Lacoste (3–15). We have kept 
the references we made to other articles in this issue where we felt it appropriate. 
2 The expression refers to the mass political violence of the twentieth century. “The 
modern terror,” wrote Miguel Abensour in 1982, “took hold with the First World War, 
‘the Great War’” (231). 
3 Primo Levi said of If This Is a Man: “I saw this book as a judicial act. I wanted to 
testify” (Œuvres 992).  
4 “A need for truth compelled [the soldiers] to write, a need to fully measure the 
formidable reality from which they had just escaped, to repeat to themselves: ‘I was 
there. I lived through that... And here I am, still myself’” (Genevoix 710). 
5 On the intolerable as a social construction, see Bourdelais and Fassin. 
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6  In the northern states of the United States before the Civil War, abolitionist 
newspapers played this role in promoting the testimony of African-American slaves. 
See Roy.  
7 For details of this appeal published in the daily newspaper Artaramard, see Beledian 
(“Traduire un témoignage” 110-111). Moreover, according to Beledian, the list of 
questions in the appeal “provides the general framework for most of the testimonies of 
the period” (111). 
8  In “Testimony for Eichmann” (1961), Primo Levi cites several such strategies of 
denial: “Why do we go on talking about atrocities? Are they not over and done with? 
...Why sow more hatred? Why trouble the consciences of our children?” (text published 
in Europe, 94, English translation in Levi et al., Auschwitz Testimonies). 
9 Beledian cites the “Literary and satirical overview” published in January 1920 of 
Yervant Odian’s productions of 1919. Odian, who published his own diary of 
deportation as a serial in the daily newspaper Jamanak in 1919, was the first to note 
the emergence of “a new literary genre that we might call the literature of the return 
from exile” (ibid). 
10 Renaud Dulong rightly points out that Jean Norton Cru’s entire project in Témoins 
is based on this concern (75).  
11 See Bernier (56). Cru, who considered the genre of the novel “false,” nonetheless 
judged Bernier’s novel to be the truest in his corpus and “comparable to memoirs.” 
12 Cru added that “war is not to be perceived by the intelligence alone (thus far, at least, 
as this intelligence works only on the basis of the legend)” (War Books 14). 
13 In his afore-mentioned article, Abensour proposes “the hypothesis that ... against the 
total mobilization that came with the First World War, at its extreme opposite in fact, 
an original figure of resistance has appeared within modernity which could be 
described as the choice of the small” (234). We believe the author’s analyses of Kafka’s 
allegorical literature also shed light on what was at stake, at the same time, in the genre 
of testimony.  
14 Maupassant was well aware, in the words of Boileau, that “at times truth may not 
seem probable.” But, in opposition to a “theory” of realism that could be summed up 
“in these words: ‘The whole Truth and nothing but the Truth’,” he considered that 
“since the end [that novelists] have in view is to bring out the philosophy of certain 
constant and current facts, they must often correct events in favour of probability and 
to the detriment of truth.” (Maupassant xiv). 
 
15 The difference between the genres of reporting and testimony can be gauged by 
comparing, for example, two texts that Primo Levi published a few months apart: 
Auschwitz Report and If This is a Man.  
16 This testimony was published in 1917 with cuts made by military censors. In the issue 
of Europe that we edited, we published three chapters of this work, restoring for the 
first time the passages that had been redacted in the original edition. See Hallé (16–
36). 
17  The adjective ansetheveth, Beledian specified, “means at once ornate, affected, 
mannered, and invented, embellished” (111). 
18 On this subject, see Hartmann in the special issue of Europe. 
19 Rithy Panh is the author, in collaboration with Christophe Bataille, of L’Élimination 
(2012), in which he recounts his experience of the genocide perpetrated by the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979. The quotation is taken from the interview he 
gave us about the book (Panh 171). 
20 See, for example, Tristan Leperlier’s study of the reception of Algerian testimonies 


















Abensour, Miguel. “Le choix du petit.” Postface to Theodor. W. Adorno, 
Minima Moralia. Réflexions sur la vie mutilée, Paris: Payot, 1991. 
231–243. 
 
Balzac, Honoré de. Preface. La Peau de chagrin. 1831. La Comédie humaine, 
vol. 10. Études philosophiques. Paris. Gallimard, 1992 : 47–55. 
 
Beledian, Krikor. “Le retour de la Catastrophe.” L’Histoire trouée. Négation 
et témoignage. Ed. Catherine Coquio. Nantes: L’Atalante, 2003. 299–
328. 
 
¾. “Traduire un témoignage écrit dans la langue des autres.” Mémoires du 
génocide arménien. Héritage traumatique et travail analytique. Eds. 
Vahram Altounian and Janine Altounian, Paris: P.U.F., 2009. 97–112. 
http://memoires.ommx.org/book#97 
 
Benjamin, W. (1999) The Arcades Project. Trans. H. Eiland & K. McLauchlin. 
Cambrigde, MA: Harvard UP. 
 
Bernier, Jean. La Percée. Roman d’un fantassin, 1914-1915. Marseille: Agone, 
2004. 
 
Bourdelais, Patrice and Didier Fassin, eds. Les Constructions de l’intolérable. 
Études d’anthropologie et d’histoire sur les frontières de l’espace 
moral, Paris: La Découverte, 2005. 
 
Broch, Hermann. “Notes on the Problem of Kitsch.” 1950. Kitsch: The World 
of Bad Taste. Ed. Gillo Dorfles. London: Studio Vista, 1969. 
 
Chevrier, Jean-François and Philippe Roussin. “Présentation.” 
Communications. Le parti pris du document : littérature, 
photographie, cinéma et architecture au XXe siècle, n° 71, 2001 : 5–11. 
 
Cohen, Marcel. “Faire avec presque rien, ou le métier d’un écrivain stupéfait.” 
Europe. Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016 : 207–220. 
 
Cru, Jean Norton. Témoins. Essai d’analyse et de critique des souvenirs de 
combattants édités en français de 1915 à 1928. 1929. Nancy: Presses 
universitaires de Nancy, 2006. 
 
¾. War Books. A Study in Historical Criticism. N.d. TS. BU des Fenouillères 




Detue, Frédérik and Charlotte Lacoste. “Ce que le témoignage fait à la 
littérature.” Europe. Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016 : 
3–15. https://bit.ly/2JByPue. 
 








Synthesis 13 (2020) 35 
 
Detue, Frédérik and Charlotte Lacoste. Eds. “Ce que le témoignage fait à la 
littérature.” Europe. Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016. 
 
Dorgelès, Roland. Souvenirs sur les Croix de bois. Paris: À la Cité des livres, 
1929. 
 
Dulong, Renaud. Le Témoin oculaire. Les conditions sociales de l’attestation 
personnelle. Paris: Éd. de l’E.H.E.S.S., 1998. 
 
Genevoix, Maurice. Ceux de 14. 1950. Paris: Le Seuil, 2007. 
 
Hallé, Guy. “Là-bas. Avec ceux qui souffrent.” Europe. Témoigner en 
littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016 :  16–36. 
 
Hartmann, Marie “Négation et détournement des témoignages 
concentrationnaires : la trilogie allemande de Louis-Ferdinand 
Céline.” Europe. Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016: 99-
114. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric J. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991. 
London: Abacus, 1995. 
 
Jubert, Raymond. Verdun. Mars-avril-mai 1916. 1918, posth. Nancy: 
Presses universitaires de Nancy, 1989. 
 
Kimpflin, Georges. Le Premier souffle. Un fantassin sur la trouée de Charmes, 
août-septembre 1914. Paris: Perrin, 1920. 
 
Leperlier, Tristan. “Témoins algériens de la “décennie noire en France.” 
Europe. Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016 : 178-191. 
 
Les Messagers. Directed by Hélène Crouzillat and Laetitia Tura. The Kingdom 
/ Territoires en marge, 2014, 70 min. 
 
Levi, Primo. “Appendice per l’edizione scolastica di Se questo è un uomo, ” in 
Primo Levi, Opere, Volume Primo. Torino: Einaudi, 1987. 171–201.  
 
¾. Auschwitz Report [1946]. Trans. Judith Woolf. London: Verso, 2015. 
 
¾. La Zone grise. Entretien avec Anna Bravo et Federico Cereja, Trans. 
M. Rueff. Paris: Payot & Rivages, 2014. 
 
¾. Œuvres. Paris: R. Laffont, 2005. 
 
¾. The Complete Works of Primo Levi. Edited by Ann Goldstein. London & 
New York: Penguin Classics. 
 
¾. Si c’est un homme. Trans. M. Schruoffeneger. Paris: Pocket, 2003. 
 








Synthesis 13 (2020) 36 
 
Levi, Primo, Benedetti L. De, Fabio Levi, and Domenico Scarpa. Auschwitz 
Testimonies, 1945-1986. Trans. Judith Woolf. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2018. 
 
Maupassant, Guy de. “Of ‘The Novel’”. Preface to Pierre et Jean. Trans. Clara 
Dell. New York: Collier & Son. 
 
Missakian, Chavarche. “La Grande Crise.” Trans. Krikor Beledian. Europe. 
Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016 : 47-59. 
 
Morioka Todeschini, Maya. “Écrire la bombe. Ôta Yôko, Ville des cadavres.” 
Europe. Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016 : 135–138. 
 
Panh, Rithy. “L’art du survivant, une attitude.” Europe. Témoigner en 
littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016 : 162–177. 
 
Perec, Georges. “Robert Antelme, or the Truth of Literature.” On Robert 
Antelme’s The Human Race. Ed. Daniel Dobbels. Trans. Jeffrey 
Haight. Illinois: Northwestern UP, 2003. 139–152. 
 
Rastier, François “‘L’odeur de la chair brûlée’. Témoignage et mentir-vrai.” 
Europe. Témoigner en littérature, no. 1041-1042, 2016. 115–134. 
 
¾. “Témoignages inadmissibles.” Littérature. Écrire l’histoire, vol. 159, no. 3, 
2010. 108–129. 
 
Rivette, Jacques. “De l’abjection.” Cahiers du cinéma, no. 120, 1961 : 54–55. 
 
Roy, Michaël. Textes fugitifs. Le récit d’esclave au prisme de l’histoire du livre. 
Lyon: ENS Éditions / Institut d’histoire du livre, 2018. 
 
 
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:29:18 |
